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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFICTS-Grouping of Contacts-Babcock restricted in ap-
plication to cases where both parties are residents of New York-
Long v. Pan American World Airways (N. Y. 1965)
This action, arising out of an airplane crash was brought
against Pan American for the wrongf-al death of two passengers,
Long and Grieco.' The defendant moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the ground that, since the accident occurred in Mary-
land, the law of that state should govern. A Maryland statute
specified those persons who could bring an action for wrongful
death and the plaintiffs were not among those enumerated.
2
The Supreme Court of New York denied the motion." On appeal
to the appellate division, held, reversed. The grouping of contacts
doctrine adopted in Babcock v. Jackson4 does not entirely super-
sede the traditional vested rights theory in the choice of law
area but operates only in situations where both parties are resi-
dents of New York. Long 'v. Pan American World Airways, 260
N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div. 1965). (3-to-2).
The restriction placed upon the Babcock doctrine appears to
be unwarranted. Although the grouping of contacts theory has
been totally rejected by some states,6 it appears that Long
represents the first attempt to restrict the actual scope of the
doctrine.
7
The rationale behind the narrow interpretation of Babcock
was that the grouping of contacts theory tended to encourage
forum shopping.8 The effect of such practice was greatly em-
1. G. Leroy Long, Atha M. Cooper and W. Donald Sparks as executors of
the estate of Clyde W. Long, deceased; and, Joseph J. Grieco and Louis A.
Grieco as administrators of the estate of Ernest L. Grieco, deceased, as plain-
tiffs-respondents.
2. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 67, § 4 (1957).
3. See Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div.
1965).
4. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y.
155, 124 N.E.2d 155 (1954); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203
A.2d 796 (1964).
5. E.g., Poplar v. Boujois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E2d 334 (1948).
6. E.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965).
7. E.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Com-
ments on Babcock v. Jackson, A recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUm. L. Rav. 1212 (1963); Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing
Attorney's Reflections upon the Opinion and its Implications, 31 INs. COUNSEL
J. 428 (1964).
8. Long, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div. 1965).
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phasized in Long because the court was asked to choose between
the laws of two sister states, Maryland and Pennsylvania. The
accident occurred in Maryland, but all of the significant con-
tacts lay in Pennsylvania.9 The plaintiff could have served the
defendant with process in either Maryland, Pennsylvania or
New York but chose the latter to gain the advantage of that
state's adoption of the grouping of contacts theory.10
Admittedly, the theory opens the door to forum shopping, but
New York has faced the problem in the past and done nothing
to discourage such practice." There is, however, inconsistency
in allowing the possibility of forum shopping and at the same
time decrying the unfairness of the vested rights doctrine on the
ground that the applicable law is selected by a circumstance
which is purely fortuitous, the place of the accident.12 The same
disadvantage exists when the grouping of contacts theory is
used to determine which law governs, as the place of residence
of the defendant is just as fortuitous as the place of the accident.
This is particularly true in the case of an unintentional tort
because the defendant is not "selected" with a view toward his
residence for purpose of a future suit. That the anomaly exists
cannot be doubted.
The reason behind the willingness of the various courts to
overlook the effect of one fortuitous circumstance while in the
same breath condemning the effect of another equally fortuitous
can easily be seen. Applying the law of the place of the tort often
results in the application of the law of a state which has no
connection with the parties involved other than that the accident
occurred within its borders. Such a state has little concern with
the effect of the outcome of the suit. On the other hand, in the
9. The deceased was a Pennsylvania resident, the round trip ticket was
bought in Pennsylvania, the flight was to originate and terminate in Pennsyl-
vania and the deceased's survivors and beneficiaries of the action were Penn-
sylvania residents.
10. No other theory appears logical as no claim was made that New York
law applied and the plaintiff could have served process on the defendant in
either Pennsylvania or Maryland.
11. Keller v. Greyhound Corp., 244 N.Y.S2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1963). A com-
ment on this case was that "the ramifications flowing from decisions of this
type are certainly enough to unnerve the most fearless insurance company.....
O'Rourke, Analysis of the Contacts Test; A Numerical Evaluation of Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 11 PRAC. LAW. 87 (1965).
12. E.g., Seguros Tepeyac S. A. v. Bostrum, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith, supra
note 4; Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Comments
opz Babcock v. Jackosn, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum.
L, REV. 1212 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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same situation, a state which is vitally concerned with the out-
come and the effect it will have on its citizens is given no control
over the litigation. Further, persons are subjected to laws they
have no power to formulate or alter.13 In contrast, forum shop-
ping does not produce such undesirable results, but results in the
application of the law of the state which has the greatest interest
in the outcome of the litigation.' 4 In addition, as Judge Rabin
points out in his dissenting opinion in Long, restricting the ap-
plication of Babcock to cases involving only New York residents
may well result in a person being unable to take advantage of
the law of his own state.' 5
Let us assume that both parties in this case were New
York residents, that the air tickets were purchased in Penn-
sylvania, the flight originated and terminated in Pennsyl-
vania and all other relationships arose in Pennsylvania. In
such a case it seems that the majority of this court would
invoke the Babcock doctrine and hold Pennsylvania law to
be applicable. If, however, the plaintiffs were not residents
of New York but rather, as here, residents of Pennsylvania,
and all other factors the same, the majority of this court
would and does hold that Pennsylvania law is inapplicable.
Thus we reach the anomalous result that a New York resi-
dent would get the benefit of the law of Pennsylvania, while
a Pennsylvania resident would not be permitted to invoke
the law of his own state.16
RoimiT W. DBmim, JR.
13. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P2d 218 (1955).
14. See authorities cited mtera notes 4, 7 and 12.
15. Long, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (App. Div. 1965).
16. Id. 755.
1965]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Bill of Attainder - Federal statute
forbidding communists to hold union office an unconstitutional
bill of attainder-Brown v. United States (Sup. Ct. 1965).
Respondent, an avowed member of the Communist party, was
convicted under section 50d: of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 19591 of serving as a trade union officer
while a communist. The conviction was vacated by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
held, affirmed (on results). A statute which makes criminal the
holding of union office by a Communist is an unconstitutional
bill of attainder as forbidden by article I, section 9. Brown v.
United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 1707 (1965). (5-to-4).
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which declares an indi-
vidual or group guilty of an offense and imposes a penalty of
death. Any similar act which decrees a lesser sentence is strictly
termed a bill of pains and penalties. Thus, in either case the
individual or group so singled out by the legislature is denied
a trial jury as well as the procedural protections of courts of
law.3 The example of parliamentary abuses in enacting such
bills for vindictive political reasons led the framers of the Ameri-
can Constitution to prohibit both to the federal4 and state legis-
latures 5 the bill of attainder power. It has been assumed from
as early as the case of Fletcher v. Peck6 that the constitutional
provision against the enactment of bills of attainder encompassed
bills of pains and penalties as well.
The post-Civil War cases of Cummings v. Missouri7 and Ex
parte Garland indicated the Court's never-to-be-departed-from
1. (a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party...
shall serve ...
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board
or similar governing body, business agent manager, organizer or
other employee (other than as an employee performing ex-
clusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organiza-
tion ... during or for five years after the termination of his
membership in the Communist Party...
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
73 Stat. 536 (1939) 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV, 1958).
2. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1965).
3. See generally CHAFEE, THREE HUmA.& RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION
OF 1789, 90-161 (1956).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
S. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
6. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810).
7. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
8. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
4
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view of the bill of attainder provision as a broad guarantee
against the legislature's sitting as a court.
In Cummings, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church was
convicted of practicing as a minister without having taken an
oath of loyalty to the state government as required by the Mis-
souri Constitution of 1865. The test oath, which was prescribed
for the practitioners of some thirty-odd professions of public
trust, required the taker to swear that he had never adherred to
the states of the Confederacy in any of several particulars. In
Garland, an attorney who had served as a senator to the congress
of the Confederacy was barred from practice before the courts
of the United States by a federal statute which imposed a similar
oath. Against claims that the state and federal governments had
strong interests in having loyal citizens in positions of trust and
that thus the oaths were valid regulatory devices, the Court in
a pair of five-to-four decisions read the oath requirements as a
roundabout punishment for opposition to the United States in
the then-recent hostilities:
The oath could not, therefore, have been required as a means
of ascertaining whether parties were qualified or not for
their respective callings or the trusts with which they were
charged. It was required in order to reach the person, not
the calling. It was exacted, not from any notion that the sev-
eral acts designated indicated unfitness for the callings, but
because it was thought that the several acts deserved pun-
ishment. .... 9
Thus, where a statute could be taken to inflict manifest pun-
ishment on easily ascertainable individuals for legislatively de-
termined guilt of crimes, the act would be held unconstitutional
as a disguised bill of attainder. However, if a statute merely
sought to regulate a given calling with no purpose to punish the
practitioners, the fact that it incidentally inhibited certain indi-
viduals or a class would not require a holding of unconstitu-
tionality.10
In the Second-World-War case of United S tates v. Lovett"
the Court's view of bill of attainder as applied in Cummings and
9. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 227, 320 (1867).
10. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1899), where the petitioner argued that the licensing statute was a
bill of attainder. The Court did not directly decide the point. The case is gen-
erally taken for the implicit pro-position that no bill of attainder was presented
by the facts.
11. 328 U.S. 303 (1945).
19651.
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Garland was reaffirmed, again in a five-to-four decision. Section
304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 194312 in
effect stripped three named government employees of their posi-
tions by a provision which prevented the payment of their sal-
aries until they should be reappointed and confirmed by Con-
gress. The three employees along with some sixty others had been
the subject of a congressional investigation into alleged subver-
sive activities. After the passage of the act the three employees
remained at their positions as before and when the salaries were
not forthcoming they brought action in the Court of Claims and
were granted judgment in a plurality opinion.'3 The Supreme
Court affirmed the result by holding the act to be a bill of at-
tainder. Rejecting the argument that the appropriation act was
an exercise of the plenary power over the purse and thus immune
to attack, the Court through the opinion of Mr. Justice Black
held the singling out of three individuals for alleged offenses
and the imposition of penalties on them was prohibited by the
Constitution.
Thus, when the Brown case arose, the scope of the bill of
attainder provision had been elucidated by the several earlier
decisions.
Seeing in the language of section 504 an exercise of specificity
rather than rule making, the Court through Mr. Justice Warren
indicated that the statute exceeded the power given Congress to
regulate interstate commerce:
The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule
decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or pos-
sesses certain characteristics . . . shall not hold union office,
and leave to courts and juries the job of deciding what per-
sons have committed the specified acts or possess the speci-
fied characteristics. Instead it designates in no uncertain
terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring crim-
inal liability-members of the Communist Party.14
The Chief Justice cited the case of Communist Party 'v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd.15 for the implicit proposition that
a statute which attempted to outlaw an organization by name
12. 57 Stat. 450 (1943).
13. 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 66 F. Supp. 142 (1945).
14. 85 Sup. Ct. 1707, (1965).
15. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
[Vol. 17
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rather than regulating certain designated activities would be
held a bill of attainder. The statute actually considered in the
Subversive Activities Control Bd. case was section 3 of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950,16 the defining language
of which was thought broad enough to escape constitutional con-
demnation. Since the fact of membership in the Communist
party is not "semantically equivalent"' 7 to having a tendency to
incite political strikes, the Court in Brown was unwilling to ap-
prove the use of the word "Communist" as merely a shorthand
way of reaching the characteristics covered.
Attempting to meet the reasoning of the dissent the Court
stated that conflict-of-interest principles as applied in the case
of Board of Governors v. Agnew' were not apposite here. In
Agnew, petitioner was convicted under section 32 of the Banking
Act of 193319 which forbade any partner or employee of a firm
primarily engaged in underwriting securities from being a di-
rector of a national bank (no bill of attainder argument was
discussed in the opinion). The Court observed that the statute in
Agnew was neither based on any finding of guilt nor was it
enacted as a penalty, but rather proceeded on the general knowl-
edge of psychology that one who engaged in two potentially
conflicting capacities would be subject to temptation and that
many individuals would yield. The Court thus reasoned the
banking statute was not a bill of attainder.
The Court discovered in the criminal sanctions of the labor
act directed against persons instead of activities the fatal impli-
cation of legislatively determined guilt and punishment. Thus,
in the Court's view one "guilty" of being a Communist was
denied the right to serve as a union officer by way of pun-
ishment.
Section 504 of the 1959 act-making it criminal for a Com-
munist to hold union office-replaced section 9(h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.20 The purpose of section 9(h), a registration
provision, was to prevent the so-called political strike by denying
16. Any organization in the United States... which (i) is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign
organization controlling the world Communist movement ... and (ii) oper-
ates primarily to serve the objectives of such world Communist movement
64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958).
17. 85 Sup. Ct 1707, (1965).
18. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
19. 48 Stat 194, as amended 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1959).
20. Labor Management Relations Act §9(h), 61 Stat 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§159 (1952).
1965]
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access to the National Labor Relations Board to trade unions
whose officers refused to make annual affidavits that they were
not members of the Communist party. Since the effectiveness of
union activity would be diminished without the support of fed-
eral law, it was assumed that the provision would discourage
the election of Communist officers and thus destroy the political
strike as a tool of the world-wide Communist conspiracy. The
submission of false affidavits is elsewhere made an offense.2 1
Section 9 (h) was tested against claims that it violated the first
amendment freedoms of speech and assembly in the case of
American Communications Co. v. Douds.22 The Court there up-
held the affidavit provision of the act, finding the potential
disability imposed on Communists too slight an incident of the
requirement when weighed against the national interest in the
uninterrupted flow of commerce. Section 9(h) was seen as neith-
er the mere withdrawal of the privilege of resort to a govern-
mental board nor a licensing act. The possibility that some
Communists may not have used union office as a device for
obstructing commerce was not considered controlling, since, as
the Court concluded, Congress could have found a substantial
danger in Communist party members' holding union office. It
was also held that section 9(h) did not constitute a bill of
attainder.
In practice section 9(h) proved awkward to administer in
that the yearly renewal of affidavits, with the attendant duplica-
tion on the election of new officers, was a condition precedent
to resort to the labor board. Many leaders in the labor movement
resented bitterly the implication of untrustworthiness in the
oath requirement as well. It was also suspected that section 9 (h)
occasioned many pro forma resignations from party membership
which were made for the purpose of giving a true statement that
the individual was not "presently" a Communist. Section 9(h)
was therefore generally considered to be an ineffective regula-
tion of commerce. 23 It was thought that section 504 of the 1959
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1950).
22. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
23. [The investigating Senate committee] believes that conditioning use of
Board facilities on the filing of non-Communist affidavits has not been a
satisfactory procedure. It has complicated and delayed the processing of
cases before the Board and has had no material effort on improving safe-
guards against Communist infiltration.
S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 35-36 (1959).
Evol. 1L7
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act would accomplish the end contemplated by section 9 (h) in
a more direct fashion.24
The reasoning which prevailed in Brown to hold section 504:
an unconstitutional bill of attainder is subject to attack on at
least two grounds. First of all, the approach of the Court does
not adequately distinguish the Agnew case on the facts.
Secondly, the discovery by the Court of punitive purpose in
section 504: is not satisfactorily made. The fundamental diffi-
culty to meet is the clear history of the legislative provision as
regulatory rather than punitive.
In this respect the Brown Court departs from the candor of
the earlier cases.
PAuL R. HiBBmw
24. H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1959) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1147,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1959).
1965]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Detention of Mail- Making ad-
dressee request that his mail be delivered held violative of first
amendment-Lamont v. Postmaster General (Sup. Ct. 1965).
This case arises from divergent holdings in two different fed-
eral district courts. The addressees' mail had been detained by
the Post Office Department as communist political propaganda'
under the provisions of section 305 (a) of the Postal Service and
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962.2 In order to receive this
mail, the addressees were required to return to the postal authori-
ties a reply card requesting its delivery. This card indicated an
addressee's desire to receive communist political propaganda, and
after it was turned in he automatically received all future mail
of this type without further detention. Instead of complying
with this procedure, the addressees instituted a suit to enjoin the
statute's enforcement. They were then notified by the post office
that because of the suit, their mail would no longer be detained.
One district court held that the question of first amendment
abridgment had been mooted by the post office's subsequent de-
livery of the detained mail,3 while the other held that the statute
was unconstitutional on its face.
4
1. "(i) The term 'political propaganda' includes any oral, visual, graphic,
written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person (1)
which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same
believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce,
or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within
the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or
with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the
United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates,
advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder,
civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other
American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision
of any other American republic by any means involving the use of force or
violence." Foreign Agents Registration Act § 1 (j) (1938), 22 U.S.C. § 611 (j)
(1959).
2. "(a). Mail matter, except sealed letters, which originates or which is
printed, or otherwise prepared in a foreign country and which is determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to rules and regulations to be promul-
gated by him to be 'communist political propaganda,' shall be detained by the
Postmaster General upon its arrival for delivery in the United States, or upon
its subsequent deposit in the United States, and the addressee shall be notified
that such matter has been received and will be delivered only upon the addres-
see's request, except that such detention shall not be required in the case of any
matter which is furnished pursuant to subscription or which is otherwise ascer-
tained by the Postmaster General to be desired by the addressee. If no request
for delivery is made by the addressee within a reasonable time, which shall not
exceed sixty days, the matter detained shall be disposed of as the Postmaster
General directs." Postal Service and Public Employees Salary Act § 305 (a)
(1962), 39 U.S.C.A. § 4008 (a) (1962).
3. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 229 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
4. 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
[Vol. 17
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/10
RECENT DEIsIONS
After these decisions were handed down, the Post Office De-
partment changed its procedure under the statute by requiring
the detention of every parcel regardless of whether the addressee
had submittl a reply card. Thus, when the instant case reached
the Supreme Court, the question of mootness was eliminated. On
the remaining question of the statute's constitutionality, the
Supreme Court, held, the statute was an unconstitutional limita-
tion on the unfettered exercise of the addressees' first amend-
ment rights. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 85 Sup. Ct. 1493
(1965). (6-to-2 concurring). 5
The Court's observation that this statute conflicts with the
uninhibited and wide open debate, contemplated by the first
amendment, 6 appears to be a restatement of the rationale, used
in New York Times v. Sullivan,7 that the exchange of ideas
must be encouraged. The Court considers that the first amend-
ment is designed to protect all views, no matter how unpopular
they are, because only through the exchange of ideas can needed
political and social changes be made.8 Previously, the Court has
held that the first amendment protected the right to receive lit-
erature, as well as to disseminate it 9 and, thus, the mail is con-
stitutionally protected on a par with speech.'0 The mail is not a
privilege that the government can control at will," but, rather,
a withdrawal of mailing privileges denies a first amendment
freedom. 1
2
In Lamont the Court held that the statute's required reply
card constituted a prior restraint, thus malking the statute uncon-
stitutional. In support of this holding the Court cited several
similar instances of prior restraint, such as a flat license tax on
door to door canvassing and solicitation,13 and a city ordinance
5. A concurring opinion states that access to publications, though not an
expressed right given by the first amendment, was a constitutionally protected
right because it was necessary for the full exercise of expressed first amend-
ment rights, and that not even the minutest interference with these first amend-
ment rights could be tolerated absent overriding, constitutionally valid, govern-
mental interests. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 85 S. Ct. 1493, 1947 (1965).
6. Id. at 1496-97.
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
9. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
10. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 85 Sup. Ct. 1493 (1965) ; United States v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
11. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); see Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
12. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
13. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
1965]
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requiring a permit before literature could be distributed. 14 In
Thomas v. Collinsl5 the Court struck down a registration re-
quirement that was a prerequisite to the making of a speech to
solicit union members, even though it was not shown that per-
mission, if applied for, would not be granted. Similarly in
Lamont the mail would have been delivered when the reply card
was returned. The Court reasoned that since a direct halting of
the flow of mail was forbidden by the Constitution, an indirect
method of achieving the same result should likewise be for-
bidden, and the required card was such an indirect method. Just
as controlling the flow of ideas to the public through a licensing
or taxing regulation is a denial of first amendment rights, so too
controlling the flow of mail denies the same rights. "The ad-
dressee carries an affirmative obligation which we do not think
the government may impose on him.,' 6
There are several cases which have held that the first amend-
ment does not guarantee an absolute right.1 In Breade v. City of
Alexandria'8 the Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance
requiring that house to house solicitors be invited by the resident
or obtain his permission before calling at his home. The Court
declared that the city had a valid interest in protecting its citi-
zens from annoyance, even though this interest limits the abso-
lute right of free speech. Where there is a clear and present
danger that some other constitutional right may be violated,
limitation on free speech will be allowed. 19 For example, during
a war the interests of the government are superior to unlimited
speech.20 Further, a city has the right to protect its citizens from
annoying noise21 and from the threat of riot and disorder.22 In
order for the Court to allow a limitation on the right of free
speech, the danger must be clear and present, and must threaten
paramount interests.23 There must be a compelling constitu-
14. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
15. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
16. Lamont v. Postmaster General, .rupra, note 10 at 1496.
17. E.g., Breade v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ; Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
18. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
19. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
22. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
23. Thomas v. Collins, supra, note 15 at 530.
[Vol. 17
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tional interest before limitations on freedom of speech will be
tolerated.
24
Through the statute challenged in Lamont the government
would have been able to eliminate the annoyance and irritation
to persons who received this mail but who had not asked for it
and did not want it. It appears that the protection of this inter-
est was not paramount to the denial of free speech, nor does it
appear that the sending of this propaganda gives rise to a grave
abuse or a compelling overriding governmental interest.
ROBERT A. MCIKENzm
24. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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CORPORATIONS-Securities- Conversion of preferred into
common held a sale within meaning of section 16 (b)-Blau v.
Lamb (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Air-Ways Industries, Inc. offered to the shareholders of
Lamb Industries, Inc. an exchange of one share of convertible
preferred of Air-Ways for each five shares of Lamb Industries,
Inc. common stock. The conversion rate was adjustable to protect
the preferred shareholders' proportional interest against the di-
luting effects of possible splits or stock dividends in the common
issue. The offer was in some part motivated by a desire to obtain
for Air-Ways a management team then in the employ of Lamb
Industries and to vest control of Air-Ways in Edward Lamb and
his interests. Out of the consummated exchange and certain
subsequent transactions a shareholder' of Air-Ways brought
suit on behalf of the corporation to recover "short swing" profits
from Edward Lamb, an insider by virtue of his position as offi-
cer, director, and member of the executive committee, and the
Lamb family holding company, holding beneficial ownership
of over ten percent of the outstanding common stock of Air-
Ways.
The plaintiff contended that the series of maneuvers, whereby
the defendants exchanged Lamb Industries common into Air-
Ways preferred, and almost simultaneously converted into
Air-Ways common at a work out rate of three and one half
shares of common for each preferred share, and subsequently
sold the common thus obtained within three months, constituted
two counts of "purchase" and "sale" transactions within the
meaning of section 16(b) 2 of the Securities Exchange Act by
"insiders" rendering them liable to the corporation for such
1. An earlier action established the plaintiff's right to bring this action.
BIau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1963).
2. For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any pur-
chase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1963).
[Vol. 17
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short swing profits.3 Held, the voluntary conversion was both
a purchase of the common and a sale of the preferred. Blau v.
Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The significance of the holding that a voluntary conversion
of preferred into common is a sale4 is that this is the first case
where that question has been squarely reached, and it clarifies a
rather troublesome reconciliation of two earlier, important but
seemingly divergent cases.
The defendant relied on the case of Ashland Oil & Refining
Co. v. Newman,5 contending that because of the inclusion of the
anti-dilution feature, similar to one in Ashland Oil, the con-
tinuity of the initial investment was not broken; the issues were
therefore economic equivalents; and, in effect, the conversion was
not a sale. The court, however, distinguished Ashland Oil and
reached the result recently presaged by Heli-Coil Corp. v. Web-
ster,6 where conversion of convertible debentures7 was held a
sale constituting the second half of a purchase-sale short swing.
At the time of the Cook and Feldman commentary in 1953,8
the only case of a conversion falling within the ambit of section
16(b) was Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte.9 In that case the de-
fendants were beneficial owners of a controlling majority of the
common shares and a large block of convertible preferred which
was convertible at a fixed rate and redeemable at a fixed price.
In a time of rising prices of the common the corporation gave
notice of a call. Before the redemption date the defendants con-
verted into common and sold the common at a profit within six
months. Conversion was held a purchase for the first half of the
common stock transaction by reasoning that if conversion was
not a purchase it would offer the speculative opportunity to
3. That the exchange was a purchase for the first half of the preferred stock
transaction is well settled. See, e.g., Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132
F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds 232 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir. 1956); Fistel v. Christman, 135 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Blau v.
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
4. Purchase and Sale are defined by the Act at § 3(a) (13)-(14), 15 U.S.C.
§78c(a)(13)-(14) (1963) as "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire," and "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."
5. 163 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1957), aff'd sub nom, Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959) (only the
shareholder appealed).
6. 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.C.NJ. 1963).
7. Convertible debentures are unexempted equity securities as defined by the
Act at § 3(a) (10)-(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10)-(12) (1963).
8. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act,
66 HARV. L. Rv. 386, 612 (1953).
9. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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abuse inside information that the statute was designed to pre-
vent. Important here was the persuasion that the defendants
were in a position to control the call. Whether such conversion
could also be considered a sale was left unanswered, but Park &
Tilford appeared to be authoritative that all conversions were
purchases.10
In 1954 Roberts v. Eaton11 involved a complete reclassification
of one class into two new classes of shares. This was not consid-
ered such a speculative opportunity as was within the statute
and the reclassification was not considered a purchase. Park &
Tfilford was regarded in the light of the facts of the case as
standing for the proposition that a "voluntary" conversion was
a purchase but the case did not go so far as to hold that the
absence of an individual option (to refuse the new security) was
sufficient alone to be controlling. Moreover the fact that the
exchange securities were new and had no independent value
presented no speculative opportunity.
Ashland Oil c Refining Co. v. Newman 12 presented a similar
fact situation to Park & Tilford but was distinguishable in two
important particulars. The defendant director in Ashland Oil
had acquired shares of convertible preferred with an anti-dilu-
tion feature, but the defendant did not possess sufficient owner-
ship to exert control over the board. When the corporation gave
notice that the preferred would be redeemed, he converted into
common which he subsequently sold. The conversion was held
not to be a purchase of the common. Park & Tilford was distin-
guished in that the preferred in that case had no existing market
and the common received was more valuable in fact. In Ashland
Oil, due to the anti-dilution feature and that both the preferred
and the common were readily saleable, any rise in the price of
the common would have a corresponding rise in the price of the
preferred. Thus the shares exchanged were considered the eco-
nomic equivalents of those received.18 Further, the defendant in
Ashland Oil did not have a controlling interest, as the defend-
ants in Park & Tilford did, and was in no position to control
the call.
Under the threat of the impending call each alternative dis-
position of the shares other than conversion was effectively
10. See Note, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 296 (1959).
11. 119 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denicd, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
12. Supra note 5.
13. 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958).
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closed. If the shareholder waited for redemption at a call price
lower than the prevailing market price he would be forced into
taking a loss. If he should sell the preferred at the market price
be would be forced out of ownership entirely, losing the right to
convert which he had purchased.' Conversion, then, was prac-
tically unavoidable.
Ashland Oil was thought to limit the application of Park &
Tilford as a precedent for applying section 16 (b) to conversions
despite the distinctions and the reconciliation of the cases by the
court.15
In the interim between Park & Tilford an important half step
was taken in Reli-Coil Corp. v. Webster.16 The defendant di-
rector held callable debentures which were convertible into com-
mon at the option of the holder. The debentures provided for
an adjustable conversion rate. There was no call for redemption.
Drawing from Park & Tilford the court logically concluded that
if a conversion is a purchase of the exchange security, then, it is
necessarily a sale of the convertible security.17 The defendant
contended that Ashland Oil controlled on that point in that there
had been no change in their proportional interests. However, the
court held that although many factors were cited in Ashland Oil
as a basis for the decision it was obvious that the controlling
factor was that of the involuntary nature of the conversion and
that here the conversion was wholly voluntary.
Heli-Coil thus set the stage for Blau v. Lamb.18 Turning to
the anti-dilution feature in Lamb the court determined that the
issues were not economic equivalents; that the receipt of common
by the defendants significantly increased their investment posi-
tion by giving them greater voting power, greater dividends,
and increased marketability. "To put this another way, conver-
sion into common required an investment decision based upon
wholly different considerations than those involved in the deci-
sion to exchange for the preferred stock."' 9 This makes it clear
that the presence of an anti-dilution provision is too weak a
safeguard to be controlling. Seldom, if ever, will preferred and
common be equivalent unless the preferred is fully participating.
14. See 72 HARv. L. Rrv. 1392 (1959); 59 HAV. L. REv. 769 (1946).
15. 72 HARv. L. REv. 1392, 1394 (1959).
16. Supra note 6.
17. See in this respect Blau v. Lamb, 163 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
where the implications are discussed in denying motions for summary judgment,
18. 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19. Id. at 158.
1965]
17
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SouTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEW
In that case the existence of any preference would make it inad-
visable to convert. It is the option to convert that creates the
speculative opportunity to abuse inside information. The diver-
gence from Park & Tilford, then, has come when the option
aspect has become so diminished that conversion is practically
hiperative. In the present case:
The element of involuntariness, so crucial to the decision in
the Ashland Oil case, was totally absent here. Unlike the
insider in Ashland Oil, Edward Lamb was in full control
of the corporation whose shares were traded; indeed he was
the guiding force behind the plan of exchange between
Air-Way and Industries .... In addition, the exchange
• . .served Lamb's long range goal of acquiring dominance
of Air-Way. It requires little imagination to infer from
such factors a corporate milieu rife with opportunities for
speculation and misuse of inside information.
20
Ashland Oil survives only in that it represents that "same flex-
ible approach consistent with Section 16(b)'s purpose as has long
been employed by the courts in varying factual patterns to con-
strue the essential statutory concepts of purchase and sale."21
The test that has evolved is whether the "transaction is of a kind
which can possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by
Section 16 (b)."22 Applying that test to the instant case the pos-
sibility of speculation is obvious. When conversion is involuntary
there is no value in possessing inside information, but when it is
truly optional it is in effect the same as selling the convertible
security for cash, and purchasing common with the proceeds.
RALPH C. ROBINsoN, JR.
20. Id. at 157.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid; see Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1960), affd, 368
U.S. 403 (1962).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-Legality of Foreign Divorce-Mex-
ican decree valid in New York where one party submitted to
Mexican jurisdiction personally and one by attorney-Rosen-
stieZ v. RosenstieZ (N.Y. 1965).
The plaintiff brought this action in New York to annul his
marriage, claiming that a 1954 divorce obtained in Mexico by
his wife's former husband was invalid. The former husband, Mr.
Kaufman, had gone to El Paso, Texas where he registered at a
hotel and the next day crossed the border to Juarez. There he
signed the Municipal Register, an official book of residents of
the city, and filed in the Mexican courts for a divorce based on
incompatibility and ill treatment between the spouses. Neither of
these constitute grounds for a divorce in New York.1 After about
an hour devoted to these formalities Mr. Kaufman returned to
El Paso. The following day, his wife, the present defendant,
appeared in court by an attorney duly authorized to act for her.
An answer was filed in which she submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court and admitted the allegations of her husband's com-
plaint. The decree of divorce was made the same day and is rec-
ognized as valid by the Republic of Mexico. The trial court held
that New York would not recognize the Mexican decree and
granted judgment for the plaintiff thereby annulling the mar-
riage. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed this
judgment and dismissed the complaint.2 In this case, which was
one of first impression to the New York Court of Appeals, held,
affirmed. Recognition of the validity of such a Mexican divorce
violates no public policy of New York. RosenstieZ v. Rosenstiel,
16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965).3 (4-to-2 concurring in
part).
In the leading case of -Williams v. North Carolina4 the United
States Supreme Court held that each state is required by the
Constitution to give full faith and credit to matrimonial judg-
ments of sister states. In the later case of Sherrer v. Sherre"
this doctrine was expanded, in that the acceptance of divorce
decrees of one state by another must be unconditional if the
parties took part in the divorce proceeding or were awarded full
1. New York permits divorce only for adultery. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170.
2. 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1964).
3. This case was decided with the companion case of Wood v. Wood in
which the facts were similar.
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
5. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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opportunity to participate, and the divorce cannot be collaterally
attacked in the state in which it was rendered. 6
Recognition of foreign divorces, however, has been accorded
only on the basis of comity. Comity is defined as "courtesy, com-
placence, respect, a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a
matter of right, but out of deference and good will." 7 One of
the leading cases on the recognition of a foreign divorce is that
of the New York court in Gould v. Gould.8 In this case, the
parties, though New York domieiliaries, moved to France and
resided there for five years. At the end of that time the husband
sued for divorce in the French courts on the ground of adultery.
The decree was awarded on the basis of the French court's appli-
cation of New York law which was considered as being con-
trolling. The New York court upheld the decree stating that no
public policy was offended since the parties resided in France,
the suit was not collusive, and the grounds were valid under
New York law.
In recent years the problem of foreign divorces has become
a major one, and the greatest controversy has centered around
those obtained in Mexico.
The possibility of a Mexican divorce is attractive because in
many states the permissible grounds for divorce are limited. At-
tempts to obtain a divorce in one of the more "lenient" states
are often frustrated by residence requirements. Mexico, on the
other hand, seems to offer every advantage for a quick and easy
divorce. It is readily accessable and relatively inexpensive. The
Mexican Code provides seventeen grounds for divorce, including
that of mutual consent.9 The primary advantage, however, is
that of time. For instance, the laws of the State of Chihuahua,
which contains the city of Juarez, provide that a local court
shall be competent to grant a divorce if it is that of the residence
of the plaintiff and such residence is proved by the signing of
the Municipal Register. "' Apparently under the law of Chi-
6. Courts have continued to determine independently whether the granting
state had acquired jurisdiction over the parties. See Griswald, Divorce Juris-
diction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARv.
L. Rav. 193 (1951); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-
Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VANp. L. REv. 1 (1955).
7. Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 71, 33 N.E2d 845, 849 (1940).
8. 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
9. Stern, Mexican Divorces-The Mexican Law, PRAc. LAw., May 1961,
p. 78; 33 FORDHAa! L. REv. 449, 463 (1965).
10. Ley de Divorcio de Chihuahua art. 24 (1933).
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huahua it is even permissable for the parties to obtain a divorce
by mail, without either ever having set foot in Mexico. 1
Questions as to the validity of Mexican divorces have arisen
in this country in three types of situations; the mail order de-
cree, the ex parte decree and the so-called bi-lateral divorce.
No court in this country has ever upheld the validity of a mail
order divorce. 12 The ex parte divorces, in which only one party
participates, have been upheld where the plaintiff is actually a
bona fide resident of Mexico and have been declared void where
that requirement has not been met.'13 The situation with cur-
rently the most explosive possibilities is that of the "bi-lateral"
divorce. Here, one party actually journeys to Mexico and becomes
a resident while the action is pending (usually only a day) and
the other appears through an authorized attorney. In 193814
New York lower courts began holding these divorces valid and
from that time to 1964 it has been estimated that approximately
200,000 New Yorkers have been divorced by this means.1
Apparently only three states other than New York have direct-
ly considered this question.' New York, alone, has found this
type of divorce valid. 7
In Rosenstiel, the New York court felt that the prior lower
court precedents and the number of New Yorkers who had
relied on these put the state in a somewhat different position
from other states. It was considered that in the mobile era in
which we live, a marriage might be thought of as moving with
the parties. Since jurisdiction of a court is the exercise of a
sovereign power over a particular person and both parties sub-
mitted their case voluntarily to the Mexican courts, it would not
seem to violate any public policy of New York to recognize that
jurisdiction as valid. The court continued, saying that an arti-
ficial residence in Nevada, for instance, is hardly different
11. Ley de Divorcio de Chihuahua art. 23 (1933).
12. See, e.g., Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944);
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
13. E.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1954); 33 FoRDHAx
L. REv. 449, 452-53 (1965).
14. Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct.), modified on other groutds,
254 App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1938).
15. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, p.34, col. 2.
16. Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div.
1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287 (1963) ; Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928
(1937) ; Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940).
17. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E2d 709 (1965).
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except in point of time. It is not truly significant of a difference
in intent or purpose, or in effect.
The three other courts which have dealt with bi-lateral Mexi-
can divorces had little difficulty in holding them void as viola-
tive of public policy since no residence or domicile had been
established in fact. The Supreme Court of New Mexico stated
the public policy argument succinctly:
The state of New Mexico, the children, and the parties to
the marriage are all equally concerned in the marriage
status. The parties cannot throw off their marital ties as
they would a worn out pair of shoes. Proper machinery of
the court is set up to sever the marital bonds when they
become beyond endurance, and even then only on statutory
grounds. In the operation severing the bonds of matrimony,
all interested parties are placed under the jurisdiction of a
court of competent jurisdiction that the rights of all might
be protected. To permit a foreign state or nation to assume
jurisdiction over residents of this state and grant divorce
upon request, like a slot machine in which you deposit a
fixed sum of money, press the lever, and out comes a divorce
decree, is a condition which New Mexico does not yet toler-
ate.18
After such a decision a court is also faced with the problem
of whether the plaintiff is estopped to deny the validity of the
Mexican decree since he participated in procuring the divorce.
The best illustration of this is the 1963 New Jersey case of
Warender v. Warrender.19 There, the plaintiff wife was suing
her husband for separate maintenance. The husband claimed
that a valid Mexican divorce had been granted. The facts of the
divorce are similar to the New York case except that it was
the wife who had gone to Mexico and obtained the decree. The
court held that while the wife's actions were "reprehensible" and
the "ill advised product of an emotional whim"20 they were not
sufficient to constitute an estoppel. The estoppel argument was
also rejected in the Ohio and New Mexico cases.21
Although the specific problem of the Mexican divorce has
arisen in only four states, it is probable that based on previous
18. Golden v. Golden, supra note 16 at -, 68 P2d at 936.
19. Supra note 16.
20. 79 N.J. Super. 114, 122, 190 A.2d 684, 688 (App. Div. 1963).
21. Golden v. Golden, supra note 16; Bobala v. Bobala, supra note 16.
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law regarding divorces obtained on a tourist basis, most states
would reject the New York view. 22 In 1948, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed for
adoption the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act.23 This act was
specifically designed to discourage "migration in pursuit of a
divorce." It was felt that a legislative declaration of policy
specifically denying recognition to "tourist divorces" would
cause "seekers after freedom to consider seriously whether they
can acquire a valid divorce before setting out on their journey."
In any event it would prevent a lawyer from advising that they
could invoke the jurisdiction of an extra-territorial court with-
out change of domicile. 24 Currently nine states have adopted
the act in substance. 25 Unfortunately the results of the act have
been disappointing. Few cases have relied on it as authority and
it is a rare case where the act has been used as authority to invali-
date a foreign divorce. 26
No solution to the divorce problem has yet been found and
state law continues to vary widely. Chief Justice Hudspeth
stated in Golde 27 that the main difference between Mexican
and local divorces is that the latter are a "home product." "It is
the province of the legislature to make the law and establish the
public policy with reference to divorce." 28 In New York, the
only ground for a divorce for 160 years has been adultery. Al-
though this law might be described as archaic, cruel, or worse,
it is undoubtedly the public policy of the state subject to change
22. For a listing of cases see Commissioners' Notes, Um-oas DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT, 9A U.L.A. 275.
23. The act provides:
1. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction
shall be of no force and effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage
were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was
commenced. 2. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bond of
matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within
12 months prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and
resumed residence in this state within 18 months after the date of his
departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from this
state and until his return maintained a place of residence within this state,
shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state
when the divorce proceeding was commenced....
24. Commissioners' Notes, supra note 22 at 275.
25. California, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. UNFOpM DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT, 9A U.L.A. 178 (Supp. 1964).
26. 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 460-62 (1965); 16 HASTINGS LJ. 121, 129
(1964).
27. 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937) (concurring in part).
28. Id. at -, 68 P.2d at 940.
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only by the legislature. "No court is licensed to write a new state
policy however attractive or convenient." 29 The court in Rosen-
stiel places a stamp of judicial approval on the actions of those
affluent enough to circumvent New York law through a one
day flight to Mexico.
Jomq J. McKAY
29. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, -- , 209 N.E.2d 709, 715 (1965).
(Desmond, Ch. J., concurring in part).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Conflict between State Rule and
Federal Policy in Diversity Cases in the Federal Courts-Fed-
eral policy outweighed state rule-zantay v. Beeci Aircraft
Corp. (4th Cir. 1965).
Marie Szantay brought a wrongful death action against Beech
Aircraft Corporation in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina. She alleged negligent design
and manufacture of a Beech aircraft which had crashed, killing
her husband.
Mrs. Szantay was a citizen of Illinois.
Beech was incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place
of business in Kansas.
The accident occurred in Tennessee.
Beech challenged an adverse decision in the district court' on
the ground that section 10-214,2 the South Carolina "door-clos-
ing" statute, precluded maintenance of this action in the federal
court. Clearly, the state courts of South Carolina would not have
jurisdiction of this action under the provisions of section 10-214:
An action against a corporation created by or under the
laws of any other state, government or country may be
brought in the circuit court: (1) By any resident of this
state for any cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a
resident of this state when the cause of action shall have
arisen or the subject of the action shall be situated within
this State.
The question, then, was whether section 10-214 restricted the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in South Carolina in diversity
cases. Held, the state policy underlying enactment of section
10-214 was "uncertain" and was overridden by a stronger federal
interest in providing a convenient forum for the adjudication of
1. Process was served on the South Carolina dealer for Beech, Hawthorne
Aero Sales, Inc., and on the Secretary of State of South Carolina. Beech
moved to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that (1) the court had no jurisdiction because Beech was not incorporated in
South Carolina and was not doing business in South Carolina; (2) that service
on the Secretary was improper; and (3) that Hawthorne was not an agent
of Beech and therefore service on Hawthorne was void. The District Court said
that Beech was "present" in South Carolina (through Hawthorne) and was
"doing business" in South Carolina; that service on the Secretary of State was
effective; and that Hawthorne was an agent of Beech by virtue of the extensive
control Beech exercised over Hawthorne (therefore service pursuant to section
10-423 of the South Carolina Code--"on any agent thereof"--was effective).
Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-214 (1962).
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the plaintiff's rights. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d
60 (4th Cir. 1965).
This case "invokes the ubiquitous specter of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and poses the recurring problem of properly adjust-
ing state and federal interests in the federal system."" Erie,
decided in 1938, required the application of state substantive
law by a federal court in diversity cases involving state created
rights. The "substance"--"procedure" distinction enunciated by
Erie was not satisfactory, however, in cases where the difference
between these categories was unclear. In Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Yor/e,4 the United States Supreme Court expanded Eie to re-
quire that a federal court in diversity cases involving state
created rights apply the state rule if its application would affect
the outcome of the litigation. This "outcome determinative" rule
was aimed at uniformity in result between state and federal
courts, and it made the federal court "another court of the
state."5
Guaranty Trust was decided in 1945. In 1958 a South Carolina
case that was to further develop the law in this area reached the
Supreme Court. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-Op.6 con-
cerned the conflict between a state procedural rule that required
the judge to decide employer immunity from the Workman's
Compensation Act, and the federal policy, found in the seventh
amendment, of resolving factual disputes with a jury. The
federal policy prevailed, and the "affirmative countervailing
considerations" rule was born. The court said that the policy of
uniform enforcement of state created rights, stated in Guaranty
Trust, did not exact compliance with a state rule "which disrupts
the federal system of allocating functions between judge and
jury," when it is determined that the state rule was not bound
up with state rights and obligations in such a way as to compel
its application.
In light of these decisions, Judge Sobeloff, writing for the
Fourth Circuit in the instant case, considered it appropriate to
make the following analysis in resolving a state-federal conflict
in a diversity case:
3. Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64
COLur. L. Rnv. 685 (1964).
4. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
5. Id. at 108.
6. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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1. If the state provision, whether legislatively adopted or
judicially declared, is the substantive right or obligation at
issue, it is constitutionally controlling.1
2. If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound up
with the state right or obligation, it is likewise constitution-
ally controlling.,
3. If the state procedural provision is not intimately bound
up with the right being enforced but its application would
substantially affect the outcome of the litigation,9 the fed-
eral diversity court must still apply it unless there are af-
firmative countervailing federal considerations.10 This is not
deemed a constitutional requirement but one dictated by
comity.
On the first point, Judge Sobeloff noted that the parties were
in agreement that the door closing statute was procedural. On
the second point: since the right asserted (recovery under the
Tennessee wrongful death statute) arose under Tennessee law,
the South Carolina door-closing statute was not intimately bound
up with that right. Point number two was, therefore, not ap-
plicable.
Point three required a determination of the importance of
the South Carolina rule in the light of state policy. Judge Sobe-
loff said that "the state's reason for enacting its door-closing
statute is uncertain." 1 In contrast to this absence of any dis-
coverable state policy behind the statute was the presence of
several federal considerations: first, the constitutional extension
of subject matter jurisdiction in diversity cases to the federal
courts in order to avoid discrimination against non-residents
(the effect of section 10-214 here was to discriminate against
non-residents) ; second, the enforcement in each state of obliga-
tions and rights created by sister states (the application of sec-
tion 10-214 would prevent enforcement of the Tennessee wrong-
ful death statute in South Carolina); and, third, the promotion
of efficient joinder in multi-party actions.12
7. This is, of course, the Erie rule.
8. This is stated in Byrd.
9. This is from Guaranty Trust.
10. This is the holding of Byrd.
11. Judge Sobeloff could find no legislative history on the statute and no
South Carolina Case which interpreted it.
12. Plaintiff had also sued Dixie Aviation, a South Carolina service organi-
zation located at the Columbia airport, which had serviced the aircraft before
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Judge Sobeloff appears not to be of the opinion that federal
policy against section 10-214 outweighed any state policy for it,
but rather that compelling federal reasons existed for allowing
the action while state policy against such an action was lacking.
Two Supreme Court cases, cited by Beech in support of appli-
cation of the South Carolina statute, appear on first examination
to conflict with Judge Sobeloff's resolution of the instant case.
In Angel v. BullingtonY3 the state statute barred recovery in
state courts of deficiency judgments on foreclosure sales; in
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.14 the state statute prevented out-
of-state corporations which had not qualified to do business from
bringing any action in the state courts. The statutes were applied
in both cases.
Judge Sobeloff distinguishes these two cases by saying they
involved "a clear state policy that would have been frustrated by
permitting suit in a federal court," and that neither involved
discrimination against non-residents, or multiple defendants
suable only in the contested forum. In other words, Angel and
Woods involve clear state policy; the instant case involves super-
ficial policy15 at best.
Thus, it seems that the relative importance of state and fed-
eral policy is the determinative factor in cases of state-federal
conflict in diversity cases, if the state rule does not involve a
substantive right and is not a procedure intimately bound up
with a state right or obligation. The answer to a problem of
state-federal conflict in the application of a rule of procedure in
diversity cases involving state created rights is, therefore, a
reasonable evaluation of relative importance: if the state pro-
cedural rule, not intimately bound up with a state right, reflects
a clear and legitimate state policy it must be applied; if it does
not, or if it is outweighed by strong federal policy, the federal
rule must be applied. The nature of the state-federal relationship
dictates such an imprecise rule.
S. Tucir-m McCRAvr
its departure from Columbia. South Carolina was the only state where Beech
and Dixie could both be sued in the same action. Application of section 10-214
would eliminate Beech as a party in this action and Szantay would have to sue
Beech in Kansas or Delaware.
13. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
14. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
15. The superficiality is shown by the fact that the plaintiff could have gotten
into the South Carolina courts simply by qualifying as administrator under
South Carolina law.
[Vol. 17
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/10
RECENT DECISIoNS
INSURANCE-Construction of "Use" and "Other Insurance"
Clauses-W ren & Outlaw Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.
(S.C. 1965).
A bag boy, employed by Wrenn & Outlaw Inc. (Wrenn), neg-
ligently slammed a car door on a supermarket customer's hand.
The bag boy was in the process of loading groceries in the car
when the accident occurred. The customer instituted a suit
against Wrenn for the injury. Wrenn was insured by Harleys-
ville Mutual Casualty Company (Harleysville) who defended
the suit. The customer's automobile liability insurer, Employers,
had refused to defend the customer's action against Wrenn.
Under the familiar loan receipt arrangement1 Wrenn brought
this suit against Employers' for recoupment. The trial court
dismissed the action. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Wrenn was afforded protection by Em-
ployers' omnibus clause and this policy provided the primary
coverage. Wrenn & Outlaw Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1965). (5-to-O).
To hold that Employers' policy covered Wrenn required a
finding that the loading of the groceries by the bag boy was a
"use" within the omnibus clause.2 The court decided that the
"use" here was grocery shopping and that loading was part and
parcel of the use to which the automobile was then being put.3
Such a common "use" of an automobile seems clearly within the
terms of the policy, especially in light of an earlier South Caro-
lina case which considered a similar omnibus clause.4
1. Wrenn & Outlaw Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741,
742 (S.C. 1965). In the appeal the defendant argued that Wrenn was not the
real party in interest The court rejected this contention relying on Martin v.
McLeod, 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962) where a similar loan receipt was
sustained against this defense.
2. The policy provided coverage for injury "sustained by any person...
arising out of the ... use of the owned automobile." In addition to the named
insured protection was afforded "any other person using such automobile" and
any "organization legally responsible for the use of the owned automobile."
The policy definitions of "use" included loading and unloading. Since Wrenn
was legally responsible for the acts of its employee, coverage would be pro-
vided if the bag boy was "using" the owned automobile. Wrenn & Outlaw Inc.
v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1965).
3. Wrenn & Outlaw Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E2d 741,
743 (S.C. 1965).
4. See Coletrain v. Coletrain, 238 S.C. 555, 121 S.E.2d 89 (1961). In this case
it was held that a taxicab passenger, who slammed the door on his wife's hand
as they were getting out of the cab, was "using" the taxicab within the loading
provision of the cab's omnibus clause. The court in Wrenn, supra note 3 at
743-44, distinguished two cases relied on by the lower court which reached a
contrary result. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
272 Ala. App. 357, 131 So. 2d 182 (1961) (where the act of loading had been
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The novel question in this state decided by this case concerned
the other insurance clauses present in both policies. Since the cus-
tomer's automobile policy (Employers') afforded Wrenn pro-
tection, it had to be determined whether their coverage was
"primary, pro rata or secondary in connection with the coverage"
to Wrenn by llarleysville.5
Both policies contained standard pro rata clauses.6 Also each
policy provided that as to non-owned automobiles the coverage
was to be excess over "any other valid and collectible insur-
ance." 7 The excess clause of Employers' policy did not apply
because the automobile was owned by the customer, the named
insured. Employers' pro rata clause could only apply if Wrenn
had other insurance. The court reasoned that Harleysville's
policy did not provide Wrenn with other insurance within Em-
ployers' pro rata clause because Harleysville's policy as to non-
owned automobiles was expressly declared to be excess and,
consequently, could not be "other valid and collectible" insur-
ance. The primary coverage therefore was the responsibility of
Egmployers'."
The rationale adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court
conforms with the majority of authority where the conflict is
between a pro rata and an excess other insurance clause.9
There are three basic types of other insurance clauses: The
pro rata clause,10 the excess clause,1' and the escape or "no lia-
bility" clause.12
The factual situations that present a conflict between these
clauses occur, for example, where someone is negligently injured
completed) and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 622, 195
N.E.2d 86 (1964) (where the omnibus clause did not contain a loading and
unloading provision).
5. Wrenn & Outlaw Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741,
744 (S.C. 1965).
6. If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by the policy,
the insuring company shall not be liable under its policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated bears
to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance
against such loss.
Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958);
8 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4914 (1942). Contra, Lamb-
Weston Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959). For
a review and analysis of the pertinent cases see Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
10. See generally 7 Am. JuR.2d Automobile Insurance §200 (1963).
11. Id. §201.
12. Ibid.
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where the owner of an automobile lends his car to another," or
where the relationship of lessor-lessee exists and an accident
occurs,14 or where, as in the instant case, the owner of the auto-
mobile is injured by a person loading the car.15 In all these
situations the parties involved in the accident may have coverage
under more than one insurance company's policy.
The cases differ as to the rule to apply when faced with such
facts. One court has said that the insurer whose coverage which
is more specific is liable where there was an excess versus a
pro rata clause.' 6 Another has declared, where there was an
excess and an escape provision, that the other insurance clause
more generally worded will provide coverage.' Some courts
have adopted the rather arbitrary rule that the insurance com-
pany whose policy was first issued will cover the loss where there
is an excess and an escape clause in conflict.' 8 Others have ruled
that the liability falls on the insurer who covered the ultimate
tortfeasor where there was an excess and a "no liability" clause.' 9
In one case an excess and an escape provision were declared
mutually repugnant and the loss was prorated between the in-
surers.20 The same result was reached by the Oregon court where
there was a pro rata versus an excess clause. 2 '
The reasoning in the instant case, where there was a pro rata
as against an excess clause, is different from the seemingly irre-
concilable decisions above. This theory interprets the excess
provision as not constituting other valid and collectible insur-
ance thereby not allowing the pro rata clause to apply and,
consequently, the policy with the pro rata clause bears the lia-
13. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952).
14. American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
15. Wrenn & Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741
(S.C. 1965).
16. Trinty Universal Ins. Co. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 138
Ohio St. 488, 35 N.E.2d 836 (1941) (dictum).
17. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1941).
18. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108
F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940).
19. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App. 323, 200
N.E. 849 (1935).
20. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952).
21. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110
(1959).
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bility to the limits of its policy.2 2 Taking an opposite view, some
courts have said that the interpretation of such clauses is "like
pursuing a will o' the wisp '23 or is similar to the question of
"which came first the hen or the egg."2 4 It would seem the
rationale applied by the South Carolina Supreme Court is cer-
tainly more satisfactory in legal analysis.
The South Carolina law appears settled by the instant case
that if there is coverage by two insurance policies, one of which
is excess over all other valid and collectible insurance, and the
other policy only contains a pro rata clause, that the latter com-
pany bears the loss to the limits of its policy. The excess insur-
ance is not other valid and collectible insurance; therefore, the
pro rata clause is not applicable because there is no other insur-
ance for the proration. It may be suggested, that with regard to
the insurance company who provides extended coverage, the
solution is to be positive that the insurance will be excess under
any factual situation.25 Where the courts are faced with both
excess or no liability clauses applicable, they have not left the
insured without coverage, but have declared the clauses mutually
repugnant and prorated the loss.2 6 This would certainly be more
profitable for an insurance company than to suffer the loss to
the limits of its policy, as in the instant case, before the other
insurance company's excess coverage could be reached.
Jonu U. Bm ., III
22. Wrenn & Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 142 S.E.2d 741
(S.C. 1965), accord, American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th
Cir. 1958); McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952).
23. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 122, 341
P.2d 110, 115-16 (1959) where there was a pro rata clause versus an excess
clause the court declared the clauses repugnant and prorated the loss.
24. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 719 (7th Cir.
1941) where there was an excess and an escape or no liability clause.
25. One such provision could be:
This insurance is hereby declared to be excess over any other valid and
collectible insurance available to the named insured or any other person or
property covered by this policy, whether in respect to the owned automobile
or otherwise or against any other losses which this policy is intended to
cover.
26. See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195
F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
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INSURANCE--Automobile Collision Coverage-Definition of
Collision-Unpaid for clause not used in determining coverage
afforded by insuring clause-Jones v. Virginia Sur. Co. (Mont.
1965).
The plaintiff's truck was damaged by a falling limb cut by
a logging contractor. The truck was insured by a policy issued
by the defendant insurer. The policy included both collision and
comprehensive provisions but the plaintiff had purchased only
the former. While the collision clause made no mention of falling
objects,1 the unpurchased comprehensive clause specifically ex-
cluded from the collision clause loss caused by falling objects.2
The plaintiff sued the defendant insurer on the theory that his
collision coverage was broad enough to cover the damage to his
truck and that the comprehensive clause did not form part of
his insurance contract. The trial court held for the defendant.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana in a case of novel
impression, held, reversed. There was a "collision" with an "ob-
ject" and the comprehensive clause did not determine the cover-
age of the collision clause. Jones v. Virginia Sur. Co., 401 P.2d
570 (Mont. 1965). (3-to-2).
While there are many automobile property damage policies
which include damage caused by collision and the law is rela-
tively clear as to whether a collision has occurred, the precise
question of recovery for damage where the vehicle was struck
by a falling object has seldom arisen.3 However, in the few cases
where the issue has arisen, it is usually held that if the force
which causes the object to fall on the vehicle is a natural one, a
collision has not occurred.4 On the other hand, if a human force
caused the object to fall, the collision requirement is met.5
1. "Coverage E-Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental
loss... to the automobile... caused by collision... with another object...."
2. "Coverage D-Comprehensive Loss of or Damage to the automobile,
Except by Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss ... to the
automobile. .. except loss caused by collision... [L]oss caused by ... falling
objects.., shall not be deemed loss caused by collision or upset."
3. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 381 (1957).
4. Jacobs v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n., 135 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Mercury Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 216 Ark. 410, 225 S.W.2d 931 (1950); Ohio
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 57 Ga. App. 830, 196 S.E. 915 (1938);
Chandler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 188 So. 506, (La. App. 1939); American Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Baker, 5 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; O'Leary v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 196 S.W. 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; see Providence
Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379 (1951), in which
the court recommends that the insuring clause be drawn to specifically exclude
accidents caused by natural forces.
5. Interstate Cas. Co. v. Stewart, 208 Ala. 377, 94 So. 345 (1922) ; Teitel-
baum v. St. Louis Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 266 Ill. App. 237, 15 N.E.2d
1965]
33
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
SOUTH CAnOLIlA LAW REVIEW[li
In Jones the court had little difficulty in holding that from
the facts normally a "collision" could be considered as having
occurred. This presented the court squarely with the problem of
whether the parties had intended a different interpretation by
leaving the listed comprehensive clause unpurchased. On this
question the law is unclear.
Barnard v. Houston Fire and Cas. Ins. Co.6 held that an un-
paid for clause is not part of the contract and can not be used
to determine intent. Further, intent is unimportant if there is
no definite exclusion in the insuring clause.
In agreement with Barnard, a recent Tennessee case pointed
out that the plaintiff could not rely on the unpaid for provision
to sustain her suit and held that the defendant insurance com-
pany could not use the unpaid for provision as a defense.7
One writer8 has stated that two false assumptions must be
made before the intent of the parties can be determined from the
unpurchased coverage. One must assume not only that the in-
sured has read all the coverage offered in the policy, but that
he read the coverages as being mutually exclusive. This may,
however, produce harsh results for the insured. He might be
denied coverage where consideration of the policy as a whole
would otherwise permit recovery.9
In opposition to Barnard, Fischer v. California Ins. Co.10
held that the entire printed contract must be viewed in determin-
ing intent. The court considered insurance policies as subject
to the same rules of construction as other contracts. All sections
should be construed as a whole, not a series of separate parts.
In two earlier cases," it was held that policies are purposely
written so that a choice of coverages is available to the buyer
and that when he buys one he excludes the other. He is making
a definite decision, and this decision is an important indication
1013 (1938); Barnard v. Houston Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 81 So.2d 132 (La.
App. 1955); Universal Ser. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 213 Mich. 523, 181 N.W.
1007 (1921); Pohl v. Commercial Ins. Co., 36 Misc. 2d 173, 232 N.Y.S.2d 92
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 205 Okla. 344, 237 P.2d
1013 (1951); 5 APPLEMAN, INS. LAW AND PRPACTICE, § 3201 (1941) ; 45 C.J.S.
Insurance § 797 (1946).
6. 81 So. 2d 132, (La. App. 1955).
7. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Adams, 45 Tenn. App. 23, 319 S.W.2d 486
(1958).
8. 24 U. Ci. L. Rxv. 170 (1956).
9. But see Saul v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 176 Kan. 679, 250 P.2d
819 (1952).
10. 236 Ore. 376, 388 P.2d 441 (1964).
11. Ohio Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 57 Ga. App. 830, 196 S.E. 915
(1938); Chandler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 188 So. 506 (La. App. 1939).
[Vol. 1,7
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of his intent. In Meroury Ins. Co. v. MoCleZlan,'2 by looking
at the unpaid for portions which provided for protection against
windstorm, it was clear to the court that the plaintiff did not
intend to pay for windstorm protection and that the defendant
did not intend to assume the risk of such damage to the auto-
mobile.
The case of United States Ins. Co. v. Boyer,13 presents a
thoughtful and convincing discussion of the problem. This
court stated that the insurance commission must approve the
wording of all policies. The commission could provide for one
all-inclusive risk policy and give the public the choice of that
or nothing; but the commission has not done this. For example,
the commission has attempted to divide the risks and allow the
public the opportunity of buying collision without buying wind-
storm protection. If the impact of objects blown through the air
by the wind is a collision, why should anyone buy collision and
windstorm protection? Under present methods insurance pre-
miums are governed by loss experience. Therefore, if one looks
only to the paid for collision provision, without looking to see
that the insured had the opportunity of buying windstorm pro-
tection, loss from windstorm in the collision coverage may be
included. The premium rate on collision would be driven up by
including losses from windstorm in the collision loss experience,
making it impossible for the public to buy collision without pay-
ing for some windstorm coverage. Contrary to the best interests
of the public this would produce one all-inclusive risk policy.
Justice Cardozo stated with regard to insurance contracts,
"Our guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the
ordinary business man when making ordinary business contracts.
It is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that
counts.1
14
One has the duty and responsibility of determining the con-
tents of a written contract before he signs it. 15 A logical reading
would show that comprehensive covers all the listed occurrences,
while collision covers only those losses that are not in the list.
16
JoN R. E nmxmE, JR.
12. 216 Ark 410, 225 S.W.2d 931 (1950).
13. 153 Tex. 415, 269 S.W.2d 340 (1954).
14. Bird v. St Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 51, 120 N.E. 86,
87 (1918).
15. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 137 (1939).
16. Jones v. Virginia Sur. Co., 401 P.2d 570 (Mont. 1965) (dissenting
opinion).
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TORTS-Libel-Verdict for defamation of state employee un-
affected by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan because issue not
raised at trial level-Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (5th Cir.
1965).
On March 23, 1963, Curtis Publishing Company published an
article in the Saturday Evening Post entitled "The Story of a
College Football Fix," and subtitled "A Shocking Report of
How Wally Butts and 'Bear' Bryant Rigged A Game Last Fall."
Butts sued for libel stemming from the accusations and innuen-
does contained in this article. He was awarded sixty thousand
dollars general damages and three million dollars punitive dam-
ages. The United States District Court held that the award of,
punitive damages was excessive and required Butts to remit all
in excess of four hundred thousand dollars. Curtis' motion for a
new trial on the ground that its constitutional rights had been
violated was overruled. On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals, held, affirmed. The defendant had clearly waived
any right it may have had to challenge the verdict on constitu-
tional grounds and the award of punitive damages was not so
affected by passion and prejudice that it could not be corrected
by remittitur Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, - F.d - (5th
Cir. 1965). (2-to-1).
The defendant's principal contention was that, based on New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' his constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and press had been violated .
2
It is generally recognized in the law of libel that there is a
qualified privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern.
This privilege is limited to those matters which are of legitimate
concern to the community as a whole because they affect the
interest of the entire community.
The chief controversy has been whether the privilege extends
to misstatements of fact as distinguished from those which ex-
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Noted in 14 Am. U.L. REv. 71 (1964) ; 31 BR0OK-
LYN L. REV. 191 (1964); 44 B.U.L. REV. 563 (1964); 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 181
(1964); 48 MAnQ. L. REv. 128 (1964); 26 MONT. L. REV. 110 (1964); 10
N.Y.L.F. 249 (1964); 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 349 (1965) ; 16 SYRACUSE L. REv.
132 (1964); 42 TEXAS L. REV. 1080 (1964); 2 TULSA LJ. 79 (1965); 113
U. PA. L. REv. 284 (1964); 9 ViLL. L. REV. 534 (1964).
2. Curtis also contended that the use of the remittitur to reduce the award
of punitive damages was an improper exercise of discretion by the district
judge, The court held that the district judge could well have found that the
jury was not so affected by passion and prejudice that the excessive judgment
could not be cured by remittitur, and that he had not abused his discretion.
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press only an opinion.3 The majority of the courts that have
considered the question have held that the privilege is limited
to opinion, comment, or criticism and does not extend to false
assertions of fact. A number of jurisdictions have reached the
opposite conclusion, 4 and most of the scholars who have consid-
ered the question have accepted this minority view.5 A few juris-
dictions followed a "limited minority" approach in the so-called
"public official" rule. Under this principle factual remarks about
a public official were privileged unless they reach a certain de-
gree of seriousness.6 One court has stated that this privilege
exists unless the charge "is of such a nature that if true it would
cause his removal from public office."
7
The minority view was vindicated and the majority view com-
pletely overthrown by the United States Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 8 There the Court held that in order
for a public official to recover damages he must prove that the
statement against his official conduct was published "with ac-
tual malice-that is, knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not."9 Times allows, at
least as to public officials, the privilege of fair comment to
extend to false assertions of fact if there is a reasonable belief
in the truth of the matters asserted.
Based on the Times case Curtis contended that its constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms had been abused. However, with-
out deciding or expressing an opinion as to whether Times fun-
damentally changed the substantive law applicable to libel cases
in Georgia, whether the charge of malice given by the district
judge was adequate under Times, or whether Butts was the kind
of public official contemplated by Times, the court affirmed the
judgment on a procedural technicality-the date of the Times
3. PROSSER, ToRTs 812-16 (3d ed. 1964).
4. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLum. L. REv.
875, 896-97 (1949) lists twenty-six states that follow the majority view and
nine in the minority. Professor Noel includes Georgia in the majority and
cites Kirkland v. Constitutional Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S.E. 821
(1928) in support of this position.
5. See, e.g., Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office,
23 Am. L. REv. 346 (1889); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAS L. REv. 41,
(1929); Smith, Charges Against Candidates, 18 MIcH. L. Rlv. 1 (1919).
6. Noel, supra note 4 at 901.
7. Cotulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. 89, 94, 11 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1889). A later
federal case governed by Texas law applied this rule in Sweeney v. Caller-
Times Publishing Co., 41 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex 1941).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Id. at 279-80.
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decision coupled with the relationship of the parties involved
constituted a waiver of the constitutional guarantee.
The defendant did not assert the violation of his constitutional
rights until after the judgment when he made a motion for a
new trial. Formerly certiorari had been granted to Times by the
Supreme Court, but the decision was not rendered until after
the jury in the Curtis case had returned the verdict and judg-
ment.10 A Birmingham, Alabama law firm represented the New
York Times Company in its suit against Sullivan and repre-
sented Curtis Publishing Company in another suit which had
been filed against it by Coach Bryant. A member of this firm
had sent information to Curtis about the alleged telephone con-
versation between Butts and Bryant1 and had talked to the
author of the story prior to its publication. This individual,
along with another member of the firm, sat at Curtis' counsel
table throughout the trial of this case.
As a result of this "interlocking battery of able and distin-
guished attorneys,"' 2 the court felt that Curtis was fully aware
"that the constitutional questions it now argues had been for
some time, and were still being, vigorously asserted in Times."-3
Curtis had had its day in court. In Michel v. Louisiana'4 the test
in making a claim to a constitutional right was "whether the
defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to have the issue
as to the claimed right heard and determined by the . . . court."
The Supreme Court had previously held, in Yakus v. United
States,5 that "no procedural principle is more familiar to this
court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited . . . by
a failure to make timely assertion of that right." The court of
appeals in the Butts case thus held that Curtis's silence amounted
to the "intentional relinquishment ... of a known right or
privilege."' 6
10. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was decided by the Alabama Supreme
Court on August 30, 1962 and petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court was granted on January 7, 1963. On March 25, 1963 the com-
plaint in the instant case was filed, and the verdict and judgment was rendered
on August 20, 1963. The Times decision was not rendered until March 9, 1964.
11. The story was based on an alleged telephone conversation between the two
coaches in which Butts gave information to Bryant concerning Georgia plays
and characteristics of some of the Georgia players.
12. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965).
13. Id. at _.
14. 350 U.S. 91, 94 (1950).
15. 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).
16. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965), quoting
from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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In a strong dissenting opinion Judge Rives sharply disagreed
with the majority on the issue of waiver. There can be a waiver
or relinquishment only of a known right,1 7 and Curtis could
hardly be said to have waived a constitutional right not enun-
ciated at the time. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was, in his
opinion, directly in point and required reversal. He felt that
Butts was a public official as contemplated by Times. As an
employee of the state hired to guide and educate young men, the
criticism was of his official conduct within the Times rule, and
the charge to the jury by the district judge did not embrace the
Times definition of actual malice.' s
The major question left open by this case is whether Butts was
a public official as contemplated by Times. There is no indica-
tion in Times of how far down the ranks of government em-
ployees the public official doctrine is intended to extend. The
Court merely held that the plaintiff's position as an elected city
commissioner clearly included him in this category. 19 In Garri-
son 'v. Louisiana, however, the Supreme Court further extended
Times by declaring that public officials are not limited to elected
officials. 20 It is now imperative that a line be drawn. To include
Wally Butts in the category of public official would be a dan-
gerous extension of a rule that some authorities believe serves no
useful purpose and should be abandoned.
HowARD P. KixG
17. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963).
18. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965) (dissenting
opinion).
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The defamed individuals in this case were eight
judges of the Criminal District Court of New Orleans.
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